This study addresses the effect of hospital ownership on the delivery of services to medically indigent patients and on their communities, using two alternative definitions of community benefits. Using data from hospitals in California, the study finds that in similar markets, the amount of community benefits provided by a tax-exempt private hospital is equivalent in value to that provided by an investor-owned hospital. These results are sensitive to the definition of community benefits, thus indicating need for a more explicit identification and minimum standard of the community benefits expected of nonprofit hospitals in return for their special tax treatment.
In February 2004, the Illinois Department of Revenue revoked the tax-exempt status of Provena Covenant Medical Center, a Catholic-affiliated nonprofit hospital in Urbana, because the local tax authorities determined that it was not a charitable institution. In general, nonprofit hospitals have been under increased scrutiny while policymakers become more concerned about holding these hospitals accountable for their tax-exempt revenues (Maiuro, Schneider, and Bellows 2004) . Even congressional leaders, concerned that many nonprofit hospitals are not providing enough charity care, say they will set standards for the industry if it does not do so itself (Pear 2006) .
Until 1969, nonprofit hospitals were required to provide charity care to qualify for exemption from federal and state income taxes. In 1969, the definition of services expected from nonprofits was expanded to include other types of benefits to the locations that hospitals serve (Revenue Ruling 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117) . Such benefits, however, were not well defined, making accountability difficult to enforce.
The central question is whether the tax exemption provided to nonprofit hospitals creates a market situation that is unfair for investor-owned hospitals. For example, Reinhardt (2000) shows that current tax treatment gives nonprofit hospitals a competitive edge. Since investor-owned hospitals also provide care to the medically indigent and benefit communities indirectly by paying taxes, it can be argued that investor-owned hospitals are expected to contribute more than similar nonprofit hospitals. Therefore, eliminating preferential tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals will level out the field.
The government subsidizes nonprofit hospitals through tax exemption for several reasons related to provision of charity care. Since the United States lacks universal coverage, millions of uninsured rely on hospital charity care to receive health care services. In the absence of a tax exemption, it is the government that might have to provide such services. Therefore, tax exemption is, de facto, a subsidy for such care, and nonprofit hospitals are expected to provide health care services to the medically indigent population, as well as to all who are not able to pay for medical care. Since 1969, a hospital also can receive a tax exemption if it provides services that benefit its community as a whole. Such benefits include health promotion and prevention programs, as well as some price discounts. It is these benefits that are not well defined and that sparked controversy over the tax exemptions for hospitals. This study contributes to the debate by measuring more precisely broader community benefits provided by hospitals and compares them against tax revenues paid by investor-owned hospitals.
The debate over hospitals' tax-exempt status is fueled by a perception that nonprofit hospitals have replaced their community service orientation with a profitability orientation. To assess the relative merits of nonprofit and investor-owned hospitals, this study uses data from California hospitals and evaluates the hospitals' performance in one particular area: hospital supply of community dividends. This is one of the important ways in which the hospitals can differ in terms of public policy. The study examines three policy-related questions: 1) Are nonprofit hospitals meeting their obligation to provide community benefits? 2) Has the increase in managed care and the increase in hospital competition reduced hospital supply of charity care? 3) What hospital characteristics affect the hospital charitable contributions? Since researchers (Reinhardt 1986 (Reinhardt , 2000 Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan 1996; Nicholson et al. 2000) and policymakers started to challenge the tax exemptions granted to nonprofit hospitals, it is important to measure community benefits and examine whether nonprofit hospitals supply more community benefits than investor-owned hospitals. The suggestion has been made that nonprofit hospitals should demonstrate the extent to which they generate community benefits or lose their tax-exempt status unless they provide more service to their communi-ties than investor-owned hospitals (Herzlinger and Krasker 1987; Potter and Longest 1994; Nicholson et al. 2000) .
Background

Previous Literature
Attempts have been made to quantify and examine nonprofit hospitals' supply of community benefits. However, there is little consensus in the literature as to whether nonprofit hospitals return more benefit to society than investor-owned hospitals do. Sutton, Milet, and Blanchfield (2002) analyzed the role of private hospitals in the California health care safety net. They found that, in 1998, the magnitude of inpatient charity care provided by California hospitals was fairly small (less than 1% of hospitals' net patient revenue), and most of the charity care was concentrated in a small subset of facilities. The study did not take into account, however, the community characteristics and the perceived need for charity care. Herzlinger and Krasker (1987) studied 14 major multihospital systems and found that nonprofit hospitals do not achieve higher community benefits: they are not more accessible to the uninsured, and they do not provide significant price discounts. In response, Arrington and Haddock (1990) analyzed the hospital data from the same time period for all hospitals (including both system and nonsystem hospitals) and found that nonprofits return more social benefits, improve the access to care, and provide other benefits such as teaching. Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan (1996) examined whether nonprofit hospitals provide community dividends in excess of the tax subsidies they receive. Their results showed that nearly 20% of nonprofit hospitals in California fail to meet this standard. Since nonprofits are exempt from income, property, and bond financing taxes, the authors used the effective tax rate paid by investor-owned hospitals in California. Norton and Staiger (1994) investigated hospital supply of free care and, unlike other researchers, addressed location preferences of investor-owned hospitals and determinants of hospital ownership. Their study found that the amount of free care provided to the uninsured was similar in nonprofit and investor-owned hospitals if the two were located in the same area. However, they also found that nonprofits typically locate in more needy areas, and thus the tax subsidy is justified. Both Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan (1996) and Norton and Staiger (1994) concentrated on hospitals' supply of uncompensated care and did not evaluate other community benefits that hospitals provide. Nicholson et al. (2000) examined whether nonprofit hospitals provide community benefits in excess of the following three measures: community benefits provided by investorowned hospitals, taxes paid by investorowned hospitals, and the return provided by investor-owned hospitals to their investors. The benchmark was estimated for the three largest U.S. investor-owned hospital systems for the period 1996-1998. Unfortunately, the study did not take into account any characteristics of hospitals' markets or community needs. The results indicated that nonprofit hospitals fall short of providing the expected level of community benefits. However, system hospitals chosen for the study had higher incomes than average investor-owned hospitals. By excluding some stand-alone investorowned hospitals, the study likely overstated the amount of community dividends supplied by the investor-owned hospitals.
Relationship of this Study to the Literature
This study contributes to the literature on four different fronts. First, I use regression analysis to estimate the effect that hospital ownership has on a hospital's supply of all community benefits; most of the previous studies provide very narrow definitions of community dividends (such as free care or uncompensated care). Second, the studies that do address other community benefits either use only some of the benefits presented in this paper, or do not use multivariate analysis that takes into account both community and market characteristics. This study quantifies whether the amount of community dividends provided by a tax-exempt hospital is at least equal to the value of the tax subsidy, plus the amount of charity care provided by an investor-owned hospital. Two measures of community dividends are estimated: uncompensated care and broader community benefits. Since the data on taxes paid by investor-owned hospitals are not readily available, hospitals' tax contributions usually are not included in the earlier literature. I collected such data and have more precise estimates of community dividends. Third, I also attempt to address the issue of whether investor-owned hospitals locate in areas with lower need for community benefits, an issue largely ignored by previous research. Lastly, this study investigates what community and hospital market characteristics (such as hospital competition, concentration, and managed care penetration) affect the hospital supply of uncompensated care and broader community benefits.
Defining and Measuring Community Dividends
Defining the value of community dividends is critical for policy implications. The definition has been controversial because researchers disagree about inclusion of bad debt, public insurance shortfalls, price discounts, and profits. Although in the past the Congress and federal courts have made hospital nonprofit status conditional on the level of free care that hospitals supply, the term ''community benefits'' is far broader than merely the relief of the poor (Schlesinger, Gray, and Bradley 1996) . Schlesinger, Mitchell, and Gray (2003) have specified 53 distinct measures of charity care, plus eight indices. For managed care plans, the charitable activities include not only subsidized medical services, but also the provisioning of public goods such as reduction in informational asymmetries and other non-excludable services that benefit a community as a whole (Schlesinger, Mitchell, and Gray 2003, p. 125) . The vast majority of measures in the study are dichotomous and cannot be expressed in dollar values. Thus, it is difficult to gauge the extent of charitable activities, and apply a common metric to both investor-owned and nonprofit agents, and then measure those against tax benefits that nonprofits receive. As already noted, in this study I examine the two continuous measures of community dividends: uncompensated care and community benefits. My definitions generally follow two of the three benchmarks developed by Nicholson et al. (2000) . Table 1 lists and defines the components incorporated in the two definitions.
First, I examine whether the amount of uncompensated care supplied by nonprofits is greater than the sum of uncompensated care provided by investor-owned hospitals and what they pay in income taxes. However, since uncompensated care generally is considered to be too narrow a definition of community dividends, I repeat the analysis for a broader measure of community benefits. I constructed uncompensated care by adding pure charity and bad debt, less any gifts and subsidies for indigent care. Since all of the components are reported in the data as arbitrary hospital charges rather than costs, all of the measures were adjusted by hospitaland year-specific cost-to-charge ratios. Gifts and subsidies then were netted out, following Mann et al. (1995 Mann et al. ( , 1997 . A narrow definition of uncompensated care is the sum of uncompensated care and taxes paid by investorowned hospitals.
It is important to note that bad debt is not necessarily charity care, and the two concepts constitute two separate policy concerns (Mulstein 1984) . Estimating bad debt as a part of uncompensated care may overstate hospital supply of charity care; Reinhardt (1986) calls bad debt ''involuntary charity care'' because it includes unpaid bills. Buczko (1994) found that separation of pure charity and bad debt may not be feasible under current accounting practices since categorizing charges as either charity or bad debt can be influenced by decisions regarding reimbursement, taxation, or certificate of need applications. As a result, most studies (Herzlinger and Kasker 1987; Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan 1996) measure hospital supply of community benefits by only estimating uncompensated care.
Other researchers suggest a broader set of inputs of community benefits that includes care delivered to publicly insured patients as well as inputs unrelated to inpatient care (Ferris and Graddy 1999; Sigmond 2004 Sigmond / 2005 . In this study, community benefits were estimated as the sum of pure charity, bad debt, Medicaid and Medicare shortfalls, price discounts, and policy discounts. The sum was adjusted by the cost-to-charge ratios net of subsidies and disproportionate share adjustments; federal and state income tax contributions then were added. This expanded definition of community benefits is more controversial since some of these benefits do not directly affect the poor, and their valuation by communities is questionable.
The definition of community benefits that includes contractual shortfalls by county indigent programs, Medicaid, and Medicare, has Ferris and Graddy (1999) argue that contractual shortfalls by public insurance should be included in charity care estimates since hospitals in fact subsidize care for these patients and relieve government of its financial burden. On the other hand, counting government shortfalls toward charity care or community benefits has been controversial since hospitals freely enter into a contract with the state or federal government. Although average shortfalls exist, hospitals may not lose money on the margin when they admit a Medicaid or Medicare patient, especially if occupancy is low. If a hospital could not service Medicaid and Medicare patients at a contracted rate, then it would not enter into such an agreement with the government. However, since a high proportion of publicly insured patients are medically indigent and may not be able to afford the additional costs not covered by their insurance, I include government shortfalls in the broad measure of community benefits.
Nonprofit hospitals also might charge prices below what they could charge if their objective were to maximize profits, and for this reason, I include the price discounts in my broad definition of community benefits. I estimate price discounts as the difference between each nonprofit hospital's net patient revenue per adjusted inpatient day and the county mean of the same measure for investor-owned hospitals. Evidence of price discounts was found by Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger (1999) . They estimated that in California, investor-owned hospitals charged 12% higher prices than nonprofit hospitals did, controlling for patients' diagnoses. Price discounts may benefit patients directly through lower out-of-pocket costs, or indirectly through lower insurance premiums.
Many hospitals give policy discounts to their employees. For example, if a hospital self-insures, it may give discounts to its workers on health care services or subsidize other types of services. Policy discounts lower out-of-pocket costs of hospital workers and are accounted for separately from other price discounts.
My broad measure of community dividends excludes the hospital profits, and this is why. Although profits earned by nonprofit hospitals can be used to provide community dividends in the future, this measure is excluded due to the double-counting pointed out by Nicholson et al. (2000) . If profits are to be used to provide community dividends in the future, they will be counted toward community dividends in that time period only; otherwise, they will be counted twice. I also exclude teaching from my estimate of community benefits. Although large teaching and research hospitals create higher prestige for the community they serve, they also derive strong financial and organizational benefits from using medical residents. With respect to the latter, the quality of care provided by residents is lower than care provided by a more experienced medical staff, so community benefits potentially can be undermined. To sum up again, in order to consistently define community dividends, I examine two continuous measures for individual hospitals: the uncompensated care standard and the community benefits standard.
Empirical Model
I attempt to establish the necessity of a charity care or community benefits law that would set a minimum standard of community dividends that nonprofits would be required to meet to qualify for tax exemption. Thus, I estimate whether nonprofits supply more community dividends than investor-owned hospitals controlling for community and market characteristics. I regress the hospital's community dividends plus taxes paid by investor-owned hospitals on county, market, and hospital characteristics. The hospitals' nonprofit status is the variable of interest.
The study defines nonprofit hospital status as a corporately owned tax-exempt hospital. Public nonprofit hospitals are treated separately since they have different objectives than those of privately owned hospitals. I also control for ownership changes since such changes may encourage more efficient use of resources and higher profitability goals.
Several characteristics besides ownership may be linked to a hospital's willingness to supply the community benefits. These include teaching status, size, system affiliation, church affiliation, and presence of an emergency room (ER). Teaching status is defined as hospitals with some residents. Hospital size in this study is measured as the number of staffed hospital beds. In addition, I control for disproportionate share hospital (DSH) status since hospitals with this designation serve a disproportionately higher number of medically indigent patients.
Hospital market characteristics such as hospital concentration, competition, and managed care penetration may affect a hospital's dedication to charity care. Managed care penetration is defined as the number of people enrolled in managed care divided by the total population. Managed care enrollment includes managed care commercial, Medicare, Medi-Cal, and Healthy Families enrollees. I expect higher managed care penetration to put downward pressure on hospital profits and to reduce hospitals' ability to supply community dividends. Hospitals per capita variable is defined as the number of hospitals per 100,000 residents. A Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures hospital competition; the index was constructed based on licensed bed shares and then adjusted for the size of the county. Adjusted HHI is the product of the HHI and the percentage of market area in the total area of the state; the adjustment controls for travel costs by patients (Banks, Peterson, and Wendel 1997) . Hospitals per capita and HHI should be inversely related to competition and therefore positively related to the supply of community dividends.
Hospitals' provision of charity care may respond to demand for such care in the area. I capture the ''perceived need'' by including five area characteristics in the empirical model. I expect the demand for charity care and community benefits to be higher when poverty, crime, and fertility rates are higher. Per capita income has an ambiguous effect on charity care needs since a richer community may not demand a lot of free care, but hospitals that have a higher proportion of patients who are privately insured and richer are more able to cross-subsidize free care. The uninsured rate is directly related to the need for charity care: the need for charity care is presumably higher when the proportion of the population that is uninsured is higher. I also control for rural location and charity care supplied by other hospitals in the market. Hospitals in markets with big public hospitals and other high charity care suppliers presumably will face lower need for charity care and, thus, for community benefits.
Hospital ownership and charity care supplied by other hospitals in the area are potentially endogenous. Previous research has shown that investor-owned hospitals are found in areas with lower need for charity care (Ermann and Gabel 1986; Norton and Steiger 1994) . If hospital ownership is related to unobservable area characteristics that also affect the volume of community dividends, hospital ownership may be endogenous. Also, a hospital's supply of community dividends may depend on uncompensated care supplied by other hospitals in the community. I used the Hausman test to determine the extent of these endogeneity problems. The test rejected the presence of unobservable characteristics that may affect both outcome variables and hospital ownership. However, uncompensated care supplied by other hospitals is indeed endogenous. Since charity care supplied by other hospitals in the area is endogenous to our estimates of hospitals' community dividends, I use a two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation to correct for endogeneity. The key identifying variable is private donations made to other hospitals in the market. I assume that private donations to other hospitals will affect hospitals' supply of uncompensated care and community benefits, but will not affect those of a given hospital.
Finally, I control for the time trend by including the year variables; year 2000 is excluded.
Since uncompensated care and community benefits measures are skewed, I use the log transformation of all continuous variables so that outliers do not dominate the estimators and the error terms are approximately normal.
Data I used 1998 through 2000 data to assess the impact of area, health care system, and financial pressures on two measures of community benefits by California's general acute care hospitals. Hospital-level data came from the Annual Hospital Disclosure Reports published by California's Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). The annual reports provide a detailed description of hospital characteristics as well as costs and revenues. The data were annualized to reflect a calendar rather than fiscal year. The analyses excluded specialty hospitals, long-term care facilities, and Kaiser hospitals; the Kaiser hospitals treat Kaiser members only and do not report to OSHPD. I used a sample of all 1,055 state hospitals to compute a competition index, hospital concentration, and charity care supplied by other hospitals in the market area. The sample then was reduced to 962 nonprofit and investorowned hospitals.
Area characteristics that capture the need for charity care were collected from various sources. County-specific poverty statistics (percentage of the population below poverty) reflect year 2000 poverty data reported by the Census Bureau. The source for the yearand county-specific income per capita was the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Annual average uninsured rates by county came from the RAND Corporation. Crime rate statistics (number of total crimes per 100,000) are reported annually by the California Department of Justice; since crime rates are not available for counties with populations below 100,000, the mean crime rate for the state was recorded. Population and total area (in square miles) data relied on the California Statistical Abstract. Fertility rate is defined as resident live births per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44. County-and year-specific fertility statistics for California came from the RAND Corporation.
Managed care enrollment estimates were based on managed care enrollment data provided by a Cattaneo and Stroud, Inc., study funded by the California Health Care Foundation.
Federal and state income taxes that constitute more than 80% of all tax contributions are not included in OSHPD reports. Thus, I used annual financial statements for California investor-owned hospitals to collect data on federal and state income taxes. Since hospitals that belong to the multihospital systems report their income tax contributions jointly, I allocated tax contributions according to the percentage of income taxes paid by the system. For example, since the Tenet system in 1998 paid 42% of income in taxes, I assumed that individual hospitals exhibit similar behavior, and tax contributions of Tenet hospitals were assumed to be 42% of their individual income.
Results
Empirical Results and Discussion
Data for California hospitals indicate that there is significant variability in nonprofits' charitable contributions. Uncompensated care contributions varied from $23.35 million to zero after I adjusted for subsidies for such care. Nonprofits' supply of community benefits varied from the low $800,000s to $304.03 million. Table 2 presents overall means for dependent and independent variables, as well as means of the same variables by ownership status. Although nonprofit hospitals provided more uncompensated care, under the narrow definition of community dividends the nonprofit hospitals supplied fewer benefits than investor-owned hospitals (including their tax contributions). Therefore, eliminating government revenues that investor-owned hospitals contribute can be misleading when assessing their contributions. The result was reversed once I added other community benefits. Some of the differences between the investor-owned and nonprofit hospitals can be explained by hospital size and location choices: nonprofits were larger, more likely to operate an emergency room, and more likely to locate in areas with higher proportions of uninsured people. Nonprofits also chose areas where other hospitals provide less uncompensated care. Investor-owned hospitals, on the other hand, were located in areas with higher fertility rates. If I ignored the location and used only the mean community benefits supplied by the investor-owned hospitals as a benchmark, only 55.87% of nonprofit hospitals exceeded this standard. This finding is especially disconcerting since previous research suggests that hospitals that undersupply charity care tend to be the same hospitals over time (Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan 1996; Sutton, Milet, and Blanchfield 2002) .
Regression results for both ordinary least squares (OLS) and TSLS estimates are presented in Table 3 . The first stage of the TSLS is not included since its results are not of policy interest; results are available upon request to the author. The instrument used (private donations to other hospitals in the 20,373,234 (20,454,414) 35,895,665 (39,731,747) 30,584,418 (35,142,244) Hospital market) is a significant predictor of both uncompensated care and community benefits and passed the Staiger-Stock test. Regression results show that nonprofit hospitals supplied significantly fewer community dividends if the narrow definition of uncompensated care was used. However, once I added other community benefits, the difference between investor-owned and nonprofit hospitals became positive. This implies that a definition of community benefits does matter. Since 16 states use the narrow definitions of charity care (free care or uncompensated care) as a benefit that nonprofit hospitals are required to provide in exchange for their favorable tax treatment, nonprofit hospitals should demonstrate that they supply such services in excess of their tax subsidies. If the nonprofit hospitals in this study did not meet the free care or uncompensated care standard, as shown in previous research, it may have been due to their supply of other community benefits.
Public nonprofit hospitals provided as much or more charity care in all specifications of the model. Therefore, public hospitals are different from their privately owned nonprofit counterparts and should be considered separately.
Although most ownership changes occurred within the investor-owned hospitals, such changes decreased the hospital's commitment to charity care. Uncompensated care and community benefits were higher in the teaching hospitals, in hospitals that belong to multihospital systems, in disproportionate share hospitals, and in larger hospitals.
Hospital competition had a significant negative effect on uncompensated care levels. As markets became more competitive (the HHI index decreased), the hospitals supplied less uncompensated care. The effect of managed care penetration on hospital supply of charity care was negative and significant. Thus, higher managed care penetration impedes hospitals' ability to provide uncompensated care as well as broader community benefits.
Hospital supply of community dividends was responsive to the area need for such care. As the amount of uncompensated care supplied by other hospitals in the market increased, a supply of community benefits of a given hospital decreased; the estimates were significant for the TSLS estimates. Furthermore, hospitals located in poor areas with low per capita income supplied more community dividends. Although significance of the area characteristics varied, taken as a group, the uninsured population, crime, poverty, fertility and per capita income had a significant effect on both uncompensated care and community benefits. Since nonprofit hospitals typically locate in poorer and needier areas, in the absence of the tax exemption such areas may be underserved especially in the long run as hospitals may close or move to more profitable communities.
Sensitivity Analyses
Our results can be sensitive to the definition of the hospital market area. Changes in the definition of hospital market can potentially affect our measures of hospital competition and community benefits supplied by other hospitals in the market. The model was reestimated using hospital service area (HSA) as the relevant hospital market. Unlike market definitions based on geo-political borders (e.g., county), the HSA relies on patient flows. Using the alternative market definition did not change my main results about nonprofit hospitals' contributions relative to investorowned hospitals. Market definition did enhance the conclusion about negative effects of hospital competition on hospitals' charitable contributions. The estimates were significant for both outcome variables.
Because nonprofit hospitals are typically larger than investor-owned hospitals, I standardized the dependent variables by size, per staffed bed. This specification gives smaller hospitals with a high commitment to supplying community benefits greater weight. The results are presented in Table 4 and show that nonprofit hospitals provided significantly less uncompensated care per bed. Once I added other community benefits, however, the difference between nonprofit and investorowned hospitals disappeared. Table 4 also shows that community benefits increased more than proportionately with beds. Thus, hospitals that chose a larger size had a higher commitment to charitable contributions.
Lastly, the measurement of price discounts can be problematic, especially in markets where a nonprofit hospital's price discounts are determined by the behavior of a single, local investor-owned hospital. Using alternative definitions of a hospital market can partially solve this problem. Although the value of price discounts changed with different market definitions, my conclusions about nonprofit hospitals' commitment to supply community benefits did not change. Rerunning regressions without price discounts did not change the empirical results in part because price discounts are a very small component of community benefits, especially relative to public insurance shortfalls.
Policy Implications
The results of this study suggest that in similar markets, according to the broad definition, nonprofit hospitals supply an approximately equivalent amount of community benefits as investor-owned hospitals (including their tax contributions). The answer to the question as to whether nonprofit hospitals fully justify their tax-exempt status depends on the definition of community dividends. If I use a narrow definition and measure charity care as only uncompensated care, then nonprofit hospitals supply fewer benefits to their communities than investorowned hospitals do. However, nonprofit hospitals provide more (or an equivalent amount per bed) of other community benefits, such as price discounts and coverage of government shortfalls.
It is important to note that nonprofit hospitals' charitable contributions vary greatly across facilities, with some nonprofit hospitals supplying no uncompensated care at all after the subsidy adjustment. Previous studies also have noted a high correlation of a hospital's supply of uncompensated care over time (Morrisey, Wedig, and Hassan 1996; Sutton, Milet, and Blanchfield 2002) . Therefore, it is appropriate to consider policies that revoke a tax-exempt status for hospitals that consistently fail to provide sufficient levels of uncompensated care or community benefits. Such policies would have to clearly define uncompensated care or community benefits since estimates of how many hospitals meet the standard and how many do not depend on what benefits are expected in return for a tax exemption. States and local governments may have different interests, and these may favor a set of different tax exemption standards (Potter and Longest 1994) . A broad definition may be appropriate in some regions or areas that value free care and uncompensated care less than other community dividends.
Since many investor-owned hospitals provide community benefits in excess of those provided by nonprofit hospitals, a policy that granted tax exemption for a certain level of community benefits might eliminate unfair competitive advantage that the current tax treatment creates. Thus, tying tax exemption directly to charity care and community dividends could encourage higher dedication to community benefits without adverse competitive effects. Again, such a policy would require an explicit definition of community benefits, as well as a hospital reporting system, which right now exists in only a handful of states.
It is important to note that I took a conservative estimate of tax contributions. Investor-owned hospitals also pay property taxes, as well as bond financing taxes. The addition of 1.6% property taxes does not change the results. 1 Unfortunately, information about individual hospital taxes on equity financing is not available, but Reinhardt (2000) showed that nonprofit hospitals can benefit significantly from the lower cost of equity capital. Such financing varies across hospitals and over time with interest rates and is difficult to gauge accurately in the absence of data. Thus, the estimates of investorowned hospitals' supply of community benefits may be significantly understated because I do not have data on equity financing. I also was conservative in my estimates of other community benefits. The measure of community benefits supplied by some hospitals may concentrate disproportionately on benefits that I am unable to measure. Nonprofit hospitals may supply higher quality of care, which was not included in my measure of community dividends. Although investorowned hospitals provide adequate community benefits to their communities, they are less likely to operate in areas with a high proportion of uninsured people. Eliminating tax exemptions will not induce hospitals that are currently tax-exempt to move, but long-term effects need to be considered. As hospitals enter and exit markets, some communities may be left without hospital care in the longrun. If investor-owned hospitals locate in areas such that they face lower demand for community benefits, then nonprofit hospitals provide community services by locating in areas with higher demand for charity care. Without the tax subsidies, such areas and uninsured populations may be underserved.
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